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Innovation in EU Governance? 
Six Proposals for Taming Open
Co-Ordination
Summary
Open methods of co-ordination (OMCs) have their origins in European Economic
and Employment Policy. Within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, these
mechanisms have developed into a kind of panacea, since a high degree of open-
ness has made them an easily accessible instrument of EU policymaking. Five years
down the road, however, open co-ordination is still too ‘open’ to be a manageable
policymaking tool. The hesitation of EU member states towards open co-ordina-
tion results primarily from the concept’s linguistic and conceptual vagueness. Thus,
the most important challenge confronting open co-ordination involves the es-
tablishment of a common understanding of the concept as such.
The basic idea of open co-ordination – co-ordination rather than legislation; open
to various actors, policies, and methods; transparent and open to the public – pre-
sents considerable opportunities for EU policymaking. But five years of open co-
ordination have revealed more deficits than positive results. The key to success lies
in taming open co-ordination through six measures:
– clearly defining the overall objective of each respective OMC,
– developing a methodological tool to identify promising fields of application,
– enhancing member states’ commitment to the OMCs,
– making open co-ordination more democratic,
– respecting heterogeneity, and
– constitutionalising open co-ordination.
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Open co-ordination:
a vague concept
Policy learning or 
policy co-ordination?
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1. Introduction
Open co-ordination, which has its origins in European Economic and Employment
Policy, seems to be about everything and, as a consequence, about nothing. Within
the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, open methods of co-ordination (OMCs)
have developed into a kind of panacea, since a high degree of openness has made
them an easily accessible instrument of EU policymaking. Since the official launch
in spring 2000, open co-ordination has expanded to numerous fields of application
and has developed a large variety with regard to legal basis, procedures, and the
actors involved.
Five years down the road, however, open co-ordination – which was presented as
a method ‘designed to help the member states to progressively develop their own
policies’ in the March 2000 Presidency Conclusions – is still ‘open’, i.e. vague, in
many ways. The term ‘open method of co-ordination’ is misleading, as over the
years a number of OMCs have emerged within different policy fields that differ
qualitatively. It is therefore more accurate to speak of ‘open methods of co-ordina-
tion’ rather than just one method.
Furthermore, there is still insufficient systematic empirical evidence to demon-
strate the effectiveness of OMCs, and their potential as new modes of governance
applicable at the European, national and sub-national levels, as well as within civil
society, needs further clarification. The democratic legitimacy of OMCs is also
highly disputed, as open co-ordination is dominated by national and European
executives. Finally, there is no convincing system of categories that might serve as
a methodological tool to identify promising fields of application.
All these problems can be traced back to an important distinction regarding the
overall objective of open co-ordination: Is it meant to facilitate a trans-national
exchange of best practice that thereby provides an important tool to promote poli-
cy learning? Or are OMCs meant as instruments of policy co-ordination?
A major reason for open co-ordination’s current ‘exhaustion’ lies in its high degree
of openness. A concept that is so vague and diverse is difficult to translate into
actual policymaking, especially within a system like the European Union (EU),
which is already very complex with regard to its policymaking procedures. It is
above all a question of perception of the decision-makers. Thus, the most impor-
tant challenge confronting open co-ordination involves the establishment of a
common understanding of its objectives and main features.
In exploring the current application and future potential of OMCs, this paper first
defines open co-ordination and investigates a concrete example of OMC practice.
Based on this clarification, the opportunities and procedural risks of OMCs are
then discussed in depth. Finally, the paper proposes a number of strategies and
measures for strengthening open co-ordination. The central argument is that
reforming open co-ordination by reducing its degree of openness (‘taming’ open
co-ordination) will enhance its potential as a future mode of governance.
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A question of perception
A question of definition
2. Defining open co-ordination – a linguistic and conceptual challenge
One of the main problems when dealing with OMCs is that it is often not clear
what is actually meant by open co-ordination. The hesitation of EU member states
towards open co-ordination results primarily from the concept’s linguistic and
conceptual vagueness. Perceptions and ideas of open co-ordination shape the
member states’ways of actually handling the instrument, and in the case of OMCs,
the uncertainties have led to a reluctance to utilise the methods.
Two examples illustrate this argument: (i) The German Länder, above all the Free
State of Bavaria, for a long time perceived the OMCs as another example of
Brussels’ appetite for competencies and therefore fiercely rejected them. (ii) From
the perspective of post-socialist member states, open co-ordination was interpre-
ted as a tool reminiscent of the state-controlled economic targets they were happy
escape at the beginning of the 1990s.
As an attempt to define open co-ordination, the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions’
passages (fixing guidelines, timetables and targets; establishing indicators and
benchmarks; translating guidelines into national and regional policies; monitoring
and evaluating the processes) are not very illuminating, as they offer only a very
general and broad picture.1
Broadly speaking, open co-ordination is an exchange of information between the
member states through mutual feedback processes composed of elements that
support learning (i.a. by setting common objectives), and that are meant to include
executives and parliaments at the European, national and sub-national levels as
well as civil society. The aim of open co-ordination is to pool information on na-
tional practices and to identify best practices in the EU member states that might
serve as guidance for others.
When it comes to details, it is clearly a matter of interpretation and definition as to
what open co-ordination comprises, and scholars as well as practitioners have
developed different approaches. This paper distinguishes between two major types
of co-ordination that are part of the Lisbon Strategy: pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon
(i.e., ‘open’) co-ordination.
The term ‘pre-Lisbon co-ordination’ is used here to connote co-ordination in
European Economic Policy (Art. 99 TEC) and European Employment Policy (Art.
128 TEC). The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were introduced as part of
European Economic Policy by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. As an addition to eco-
nomic co-ordination, the heads of state and government launched the European
Employment Strategy, a co-ordination process within Employment Policy, at the
1997 Luxemburg summit. The 2005 Spring European Council in Brussels designa-
ted these co-ordination processes – the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and
Employment Guidelines – as core mechanisms of the Lisbon Strategy.2
This pre-Lisbon co-ordination is flanked by a number of processes of open co-
ordination that were gradually set up after the spring 2000 summit in Lisbon.
These latter co-ordination mechanisms were designed to strengthen the social pil-
lar of EU integration as an addition to economic and monetary integration within
the common market. Since the member states were reluctant to transfer further
A dozen OMC processes
launched
Large variety of OMCs
General characteristics
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competencies to the community but nevertheless felt the need for deeper coop-
eration, a soft mechanism was chosen. However, its fields of application rapidly
moved beyond social affairs (see below).
Because the term ‘open method of co-ordination’ was officially introduced at the
Lisbon summit, only the post-Lisbon mechanisms are referred to as OMCs in this
paper. Open co-ordination is distinguished from hard co-ordination above all in
the sense that it lacks an explicit formal treaty basis.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of OMCs, it is necessary to take a closer
look at currently existing OMCs, although they are difficult to track within EU poli-
cymaking. In this paper’s understanding of open co-ordination (post-Lisbon co-
ordination), a dozen OMC processes are currently in operation, all of which were
approved between 2000-2002. These encompass the following policy fields (the
date and location/forum of adoption are provided in parentheses):
– Better Regulation (European Council, Lisbon 2000)
– Education and Training (European Council, Lisbon 2000)
– Enterprise Policy (European Council, Lisbon 2000)
– Information Society (European Council, Lisbon 2000)
– Research and Development (European Council, Lisbon 2000)3
– Social Inclusion (European Council, Stockholm 2001)4
– Environmental Policy (Gothenburg 2001)
– Health Care/Care for the Elderly (Gothenburg 2001)5
– Migration Policy (Commission Communication, July 2001, as a follow-up to
1999 Tampere European Council decision)6
– Youth Policy (based on a Commission White Paper, November 2001)7
– Pensions (European Council, Laeken 2001)8
– Tourism (Council Resolution, May 2002)9
Clearly, these fields of application differ qualitatively, as does the corresponding
will of member states to truly cooperate in these bastions of national sovereignty.
As a result, the specific OMCs differ with regard to (i) their objectives (more/less
defined; qualitative/quantitative; short-, medium,- or long-term), (ii) their proce-
dural characteristics (targets, indicators, benchmarks, timetables, national or com-
munity action plans), and (iii) their institutional set-up (role of actors and levels
involved).10 In light of this variety, former Belgian Minister Vandenbroucke’s des-
cription of OMCs as not a ‘fixed recipe but a cookbook containing various recipes,
lighter and heavier ones’ is quite illuminating.11
However, certain general characteristics can be identified that locate the OMCs
somewhere in between the community method and an intergovernmental ap-
proach. Open co-ordination
– does not require a transfer of legal responsibilities to the supranational level,
– is a non-binding, iterative process without formal constraints,
– has great flexibility with regard to the fields of application and the detailed
structure of the processes,
– is open to various actors at the European, national, and sub-national levels, and
– gives important roles to the European Council (which serves as the main forum
for the designation and adoption of OMCs), specific Council formations (which
decide on the specific design of OMCs), and the Commission (which coordi-
nates and monitors OMCs).
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Open co-ordination
in practice: the field
of Social Inclusion
Deficits discussed
The Social Inclusion OMC provides a helpful example to illustrate OMC practice.
This OMC already represents a relatively formalised process that contains a con-
siderable number of elements of open co-ordination. In Social Inclusion, open co-
ordination works as follows12: based on the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions, the
Council (Employment and Social Policy) set up common targets to fight poverty
and social exclusion. These targets were formally adopted by the European Council
in Nice in December 2000.
The Social Inclusion OMC features a dual structure that involves (i) National
Action Plans for social inclusion (NAPincl) and (ii) a supporting Community
Action Programme. Based on formal recommendations by the Commission and
the European Social Protection Committee, the member states submitted their first
NAPincl – including proposals for best practices – in June 2001, which were then
evaluated by the Commission. After contentious discussions of the Commission’s
draft report, the Commission and the Social Protection Committee reached agree-
ment on a Joint Report on Social Inclusion that was adopted by the European
Council in December 2001. The Report contained statistical indicators on poverty
and social exclusion and served as a basis for the second round of the NAPincl in
2003. Following the OMC principle as an ongoing process of review and adjust-
ment of targets and indicators, the Commission again evaluated the NAPincl, and
the European Council adopted a second report in March 2004.13
The second strand, the Community Action Programme conducted by the
Commission, was adopted by the Council and the European Parliament in
December 2001 and commenced operations in January 2002. With a budget of 75
million Euros for the period 2002-2006, the programme will support member state
cooperation in combating social exclusion.
While the Social Inclusion OMC thus contains a large variety of elements of open
co-ordination (indicators, targets, best practices, National Action Plans, and a
Community Action Programme) other OMCs – such as those for Pensions, Health
Care/Care for the Elderly,Youth Policy, and Tourism are (currently) less formalised.
The large variety of OMCs, the specific challenges that OMCs face in their par-
ticular fields of application, and the lack of systematic empirical evaluations give
rise to methodological problems: at this stage, it is difficult to fully measure the
advantages and disadvantages of open co-ordination in specific policy areas.
However, with the experience gained over five years since the launch of the first
OMCs in Lisbon, it is possible to discuss open co-ordination generally as a new
instrument of multilevel governance, to identify various opportunities and deficits
in the OMC approach, and thereby to evaluate its potential for EU policymaking.
3. Opportunities and deficits of open co-ordination
Academics as well as practitioners have discussed a number of problems related to
open co-ordination in the Lisbon framework, above all with regard to
– the effectiveness of the methods, which is difficult to measure and needs fur-
ther empirical study,
– the principle of subsidiarity and, correspondingly, the division of competencies,
– the relationship and distinction between open co-ordination and the commu-
nity method, and
– the OMCs’ ‘democratic deficit’ due to its executive character. 14
Laboratory of integration
Merits of flexibility
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All these findings suggest that economic stagnation and insufficient reforms in a
number of member states only partially explain the disappointing mid-term review
of the Lisbon Strategy at the Spring 2005 European Council. Another crucial defi-
cit of the Lisbon Strategy is its governance mechanism, i.e., the OMCs.
OMCs currently fall far short of providing a formalised and complete concept such
as the community method. Rather, they can be described as a ‘laboratory of inte-
gration’.15 In this sense, open co-ordination also offers opportunities for the future
of EU policymaking. The following paragraphs discuss the opportunities presented
by open co-ordination as well as particular structural deficits that the existing
OMCs have revealed over time.
3.1. Opportunities of open co-ordination
The basic idea of open co-ordination – co-ordination rather than legislation; open
to various actors, policies, and methods; transparent and open to the public – 
provides the ground for a number of opportunities for EU policymaking:
– No formal transfer of competencies: with OMCs, the member states are and con-
tinue to be free in their decisions concerning national policies. If there is poli-
tical consensus amongst the member states, open co-ordination can be imple-
mented without changing the distribution of competencies in the Treaties,
which is always a politically sensitive issue.
– Flexibility: Open co-ordination is a flexible instrument that can be extended
pragmatically to various institutional settings and administrative procedures
without requiring further elaboration in the Treaties.16
– Lower ‘threshold for participation’: OMCs were installed in policy areas where
member states are not willing to give up further competencies to the EU, but
nevertheless feel the need to co-operate more closely. Because open co-ordina-
tion lacks formal sanctions, member states’ resistance to further co-operation is
reduced.
– A means to complement ‘hard’ economic integration: Since member states are and
probably will remain reluctant to surrender further sovereignty in certain sen-
sitive policy areas (such as Social Policy), open co-ordination can complement
economic integration by providing an instrument for the further development
of a European approach to Social Policy.
– Potential for participatory, bottom-up governance: Open co-ordination can develop
into a new instrument of truly democratic multilevel governance, complemen-
ting the existing instruments of EU policymaking that are either intergovern-
mental or supranational.
– Making learning a value in itself: Open co-ordination, a concept taken from the
private sector, makes learning an integral part of the political process. This 
unique form of co-operation within the EU might prove to be a competitive
advantage for the Union by effectively supporting member states on their way
to becoming knowledge-based economies.
– Dealing with diversity: Open co-ordination is an instrument that builds on
diversity. Diversity is often perceived as an obstacle to EU policymaking rather
than as an advantage. However, by aiming toward a ‘convergence on the level
of ideas’17 rather than legal harmonisation, open co-ordination might demon-
strate that the potential benefits of diversity have not been sufficiently exploi-
ted by the EU.
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An overly flexible concept
3.2 Deficits of open co-ordination
Despite these positive aspects, the potential of open co-ordination remains under-
exploited. The Kok report provides an important overview of the weaknesses of
open co-ordination.18 In its contribution to the mid-term review of the Lisbon
Strategy in spring 2005, the High Level Group pointed out that the main deficits
of the Strategy are (i) a general lack of member state commitment and political will
toward the overall Lisbon objectives, (ii) an overloaded agenda, and (iii) poor co-
ordination as well as conflicting priorities. With specific regard to the OMCs, the
experts criticised the weak involvement of the European Parliament, a lack of
public pressure on the member states, and insufficient dialogue among national
parliaments, citizens, public authorities, and stakeholders.
In addition to these problems, a number of horizontal aspects of open co-ordina-
tion require further discussion. These include:
– No consensus on the overall objective of open co-ordination: What is the clear objec-
tive of a proposed OMC? Does a particular OMC seek to establish a process of
policy learning or a process of policy co-ordination? What steps must be under-
taken to reach this objective? The European Council was too vague on this
issue. Consequently, a considerable number of problems have arisen during the
planning and implementation of the various OMCs.19
– Criteria for potential fields of application missing: Currently, the main rationale for
implementing an OMC in a specific policy area is connected to the distribution
of competencies, i.e., OMCs can be established only where the EU does not
have further legislative competencies. It is questionable whether this approach
represents the best way to identify the most appropriate policy fields for insti-
tuting OMCs. Irrespective of the actual distribution of competencies, which
policy fields are most conducive to OMCs? What are the criteria for identifying
suitable fields of application?
– Lack of member states’ commitment to open co-ordination: OMCs are non-binding
and leave member states great room for manoeuvre in organising processes at
the national and sub-national levels. While this flexibility is one of the advan-
tages of open co-ordination, it also allows participating member states to cir-
cumvent co-ordination processes or engage in OMCs as an exercise in symbolic
politics, with consequent negative effects on outcomes. Furthermore, only a
limited number of national officials are involved in peer reviews or the formu-
lation of National Action Plans. As a result, the direct impact of open co-ordi-
nation at the national level is quite low. How can ownership of OMCs be
improved?
– Lack of democratic participation: OMCs currently exacerbate the democratic defi-
cit of EU policymaking. They are in many ways bureaucratic exercises for
European, national, and sub-national administrations. Neither parliaments nor
stakeholders are sufficiently involved, and the processes lack transparency. This
type of governance is one of the reasons why EU citizens are dissatisfied with
the Union’s policymaking, as the failed referenda on the Constitutional Treaty
in France and the Netherlands have recently shown. Is there a way to make the
OMCs more democratic?
– The obstacle of heterogeneity: The objective of enhancing member state owner-
ship of the Lisbon process turned out to be highly ambitious. Among other fac-
tors, this has to do with different priorities among the EU-25 member states
regarding the three pillars of the Lisbon agenda, i.e., economic growth, social
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 1 · 2005 Page 11
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on objectives
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coherence, and environmental sustainability. The failed referendum in France
demonstrated that French public opinion places a high priority on a more so-
cial Europe. In contrast, the UK and many new member states appear to have a
greater interest in economic growth than the development of common social
policies. Already diverse, the EU has become even more heterogeneous as a
result of enlargement. Does this diversity present a significant obstacle to open
co-ordination? Or, as mentioned above, is open co-ordination the key for
coping effectively with this diversity?
– Non-Constitutionalisation of open co-ordination: Open co-ordination (i.e., post-
Lisbon co-ordination) is not anchored in the Treaty of Nice as an official poli-
cymaking instrument. Part III of the Constitutional Treaty mentions the use of
open co-ordination in certain current and potential fields of application (Social
Policy, Research and Technological Development, Health Policy, and Industrial
Policy) but contains no horizontal article on open co-ordination. An important
reason for the Convention’s ultimate decision not to include the method as a
general principle into the Draft Constitutional Treaty was that the concept’s
vagueness had turned it into a kind of non-word amongst EU and national offi-
cials. As a consequence, if the Constitution is ultimately ratified – an uncertain
prospect at the moment – open co-ordination will enter constitutional law in a
rather unsystematic way. If the Treaty of Nice continues to serve as the EU’s
legal basis, OMCs will remain unmentioned in primary law. But if open co-ordi-
nation is to move beyond the realm of symbolic politics and develop into an
effective, democratic instrument of multilevel governance, it must be estab-
lished as a formal instrument of governance in the Treaties.
While one of the main advantages of open co-ordination is its flexibility and ‘open-
ness’, the above list of deficits reveals that this high degree of flexibility also pre-
sents an obstacle to open co-ordination. How can one tackle the deficits of open
co-ordination without giving up its flexibility? The following section offers six pro-
posals to meet this challenge.
4. Six proposals for taming open co-ordination
4.1. The overall objective of open co-ordination
The objectives of open co-ordination are likely to vary depending upon the policy
field addressed, and the corresponding processes need to be designed in a manner
that allows these objectives to be effectively achieved. The EU tried to respond to
this problem by setting up different kinds of open co-ordination over time. But the
European Council, which has the right to initiate OMCs, has remained too vague in
its definitions, trying to bridge the different approaches and objectives of the mem-
ber states in respective policy areas. This vagueness has turned into a burden for
daily political practice: different understandings of the broad European Council
definitions emerged within the EU bodies, leading to institutional rivalries and a
diffusion of different practices. Therefore, from the very beginning, there should be
a clear consensus, at the level of the European Council, on the objectives and pro-
cedures of each respective OMC. This means that OMC reforms must address the
decision-making phase and not only, as is often argued, the implementation phase.
If the objective of an OMC is to promote a learning exercise for member states, a
conceptual framework for policy learning must be developed. If the OMC’s goal is
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Identifying promising 
fields of application
European approach to
learning patterns
Content-driven rather
than legal approach
to co-ordinate policies, then the OMC must be set up to meet specific require-
ments of policy co-ordination.
Defining an objective also involves identifying the most appropriate instrument to
achieve this goal. This does not necessarily imply choosing open co-ordination.
The community method or a mix of both might be an alternative (see Section 4.2).
4.2. Potential fields of application
There are different approaches to identifying the potential policy fields to which
OMCs might apply. From a strictly legal point of view, OMC processes can be es-
tablished only where the EU does not have further legislative competencies.
Supporters of the community method argue that if OMCs were applied in areas
where the EU possesses legislative competencies, they would create a kind of
‘legislation through the back door’ that would threaten the community method.20
Others suggest that OMCs or OMC-type processes could also flank existing EU
legislative instruments, as is already happening in areas such as Asylum and
Immigration Policy and Environmental Policy.21 However, the existing distribution
of competencies should not be regarded as permanent. Consequently, it is impor-
tant to think open co-ordination beyond the present division of competencies.
What are promising fields of application? This question is closely related to the
issue of defining the objectives of open co-ordination. Ederveen et al. suggest that
one parameter for distinguishing among relevant policy fields is the existence of
cross-border externalities or international spillover.22 There are policy areas with a
strong potential for external spillover from one country to another, such as
Research and Development, whereas others do not have strong direct effects on
other member states (e.g., employment rates). Ederveen et al. argue that OMCs
should not be applied in areas possessing strong spillover potential, i.e., areas that
could enhance EU-wide competitiveness in the short or medium term, because
open co-ordination is a relatively weak tool (due to its non-binding nature and
lack of sanctions). They suggest that policy areas with strong potential for external
spillover be regulated within the framework of EU legislation rather than through
open co-ordination. In contrast, areas with less potential for external effects fit bet-
ter into OMC processes that support trans-national learning in a long-term per-
spective. If an OMC is set up as a learning process, the EU’s diversity is not an
obstacle but rather a resource and a condition for progress. In such cases, the
design of the learning process is of crucial importance.
Learning implies comparing the situation in one member state or region to anoth-
er. This requires a careful preliminary analysis to determine if and how the various
units can be compared. Consequently, the EU needs to develop a framework for
learning patterns that takes the specific challenges of specific sectors into consid-
eration (e.g., the highly competitive character of national innovation policies that
presents an obstacle to effective learning23). Such a framework will require a
European ‘culture of strategic management’.24
In contrast to the legal-based approach, this content-driven approach to potential
fields of application involves the conceptualisation of OMCs beyond the policies
covered by the Lisbon agenda, and beyond the actual division of competencies,
since competencies might be questioned and transferred to OMCs and vice versa.
Making open co-ordination
a reference point in national
debates
Careful management
of constraints
Linking Lisbon to the new
Financial Perspective
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It also means evaluating existing OMCs to find out whether open co-ordination is
an appropriate tool at all. Discussing open co-ordination in connection with the
issue of competencies might be politically sensitive, as it touches directly on a po-
litically volatile subject, but it would also provide a new facet to the debate on the
distribution of competencies within the multilevel system of the EU. From this per-
spective, OMCs do not present a threat to the community method but rather
represent a new tool for improving the EU’s governance mechanisms.
4.3. Enhancing the member states’ commitment to open co-ordination
There are three primary ways to improve the commitment of member states to
OMCs: public pressure, formal constraints, and financial incentives.
Public pressure
Public pressure through the mechanism of naming and blaming has not been par-
ticularly effective in the OMCs launched thus far. Beyond the fact that formal sanc-
tions are not part of the OMC framework, the main reason for this failure is the
low profile of OMCs within national political processes: they fall within the pur-
view of small circles of national administrations. As a consequence, open co-ordi-
nation suffers from a lack of political, public and media attention. Lisbon is per-
ceived as one of the many faceless, apolitical, technocratic, and complex EU pro-
cesses that are difficult to communicate to a broader public. Moreover, although
there has been recent improvement, member states have largely failed to draw a
clear line between the Lisbon economic and social reform agenda and the domes-
tic reform processes in their own countries. But as the ‘PISA shock’ proved, com-
paring national practices and publicly ranking them can actually put pressure on
governments to undertake reforms in order to perform better. One cannot expect
that this pressure will occur if OMCs remained relatively hidden within admini-
strations. On the contrary, as peers among peers, national administrations might
show consideration for other administrations rather than blaming them. Public
pressure can only grow if Lisbon receives greater attention within broader national
debates.
Formal constraints: the stick
A second option involves the introduction of formal sanctions. This strategy would
face a major hurdle, however: it is unlikely that member states would voluntarily
introduce sanction mechanisms, and even if they did, the example of the Stability
and Growth Pact has demonstrated that constraints can be handled quite loosely.
Finally, since open co-ordination must be conducted primarily at the national level
in order to function effectively, the sanction ‘stick’ should be handled carefully in
order to avoid being counterproductive.
Financial incentives: the carrot
As a third alternative, financial incentives could reinforce member state commit-
ment to OMCs. The High Level Group suggested restructuring the EU budget
according to the Lisbon priorities, in order to encourage member states to meet the
Lisbon targets. But this would require a fundamental reform of the EU budget,
which, in light of the current state of negotiations on the Financial Perspective
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2007-2013, is not a very realistic scenario. Furthermore, one of the main advan-
tages of OMCs is that they do not affect the Community budget (except for
Research and Development and Environmental Policy). Financing areas of open
co-ordination will therefore be a highly difficult task. But the EU set an example
that this ‘carrot’can be effective: in 1999, the European Social Fund (ESF) was esta-
blished as an instrument to implement the EU’s Employment Strategy. Ever since,
member states must guarantee that national measures receiving ESF co-financing
support the objectives of the Employment Strategy, i.e. Lisbon. In other areas, the
linkage between EU finances and the Lisbon Strategy is still weak and needs to be
further developed.
4.4. Making open co-ordination more democratic
If open co-ordination is to become an official part of the EU policymaking toolbox
in the long run, it must become more democratic. This can be achieved through
greater transparency as well as the increased involvement of the European
Parliament and national parliaments.
Transparency
Transparency is an important requirement for getting the media and public in-
volved. OMCs are difficult to trace in EU and national policymaking processes
because of their open, flexible, and multilevel character. Thus, information on all
OMC processes should be systematically documented (legal basis, actors involved,
measures taken and state of play) and made available to the public. The
Commission, which already plays a coordinating and monitoring role, has the
resources and independence to manage OMCs (by collecting data, conducting
analysis, identifying best practices, and providing government and public access to
relevant information).25 Within the Commission, there should be a clear delegation
of responsibility for OMC management (‘Mr. OMC’). The Commission should
develop an official OMC scoreboard (as is already provided, for example, by the
Centre for European Reform) and discuss it with both the media and involved
actors on a regular basis.
Effective communication with regard to open co-ordination is a challenge unto
itself, as it requires OMCs to have a transparent structure, e.g., a limited set of indi-
cators that are digestible by the public and media.26 But making OMCs media-
friendly may clash with the need for accuracy and member state acceptance, which
require a larger set of indicators that also respect national diversity. On the other
hand, a ‘more compact’ OMC would not only correspond to media needs but also
promote a more manageable process. Thus the requirements of policymakers and
the media are not necessarily opposed.
Furthermore, it would help to develop a new terminology for communicating the
Lisbon Strategy: Open co-ordination is an expression that is both overly technical
and confusing. Officials at the EU and national levels have all but abandoned this
terminology, and its vagueness has made it a difficult concept to translate into con-
crete policymaking processes. More illustrative terms such as ‘trans-national learn-
ing’ or ‘competition of ideas’ might offer useful alternatives.
Plenary sessions of the EP
and national parliaments
on Lisbon
Creating OMC islands
within the EU
Setting a constitutional
framework
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Involving Parliaments
Strengthening parliamentary discussion of and participation in OMCs offers an
additional avenue for making OMC processes more democratic. The Standing
Committee that was established in the European Parliament during the Lisbon
mid-term review should be upgraded to the status of a Committee dealing hori-
zontally with economic, social, and environmental questions. The EP should estab-
lish a plenary session on the Lisbon agenda before each Spring European Council
and invite representatives of national parliaments to these debates.27 The partici-
pation of national parliaments should also be enhanced by extending the
Constitutional Treaty’s early warning mechanism to areas of open co-ordination.
4.5. Dealing with heterogeneity through differentiation
Open co-ordination is trapped in a dilemma: On the one hand, comparison and
learning require a certain degree of diversity. On the other hand, an excessive
diversity of preferences might hinder open co-ordination, as member states might
chose to ignore such diffuse processes.
Differentiated integration is a promising strategy in light of the growing diversity
of an enlarged EU. Member states that share objectives and face similar problems
in specific fields – e.g., because they possess similar social welfare systems – could
decide to establish an OMC together. Limiting OMCs to smaller groups of mem-
ber states would provide a further benefit in that peer pressure works much better
in groups of smaller size.‘OMC islands’could develop within the EU, and addition-
al third countries could be invited to participate, as is already the case in the
European Charter for Small Enterprises. Combining open co-ordination and the
concept of differentiated integration might thereby prove to be an important inno-
vation within EU policymaking.28
4.6. Constitutionalising open co-ordination
Treaty provisions matter in the EU.29 One might make the counterargument that,
for example, the introduction of provisions on enhanced co-operation into the
Treaties has had no positive effect on the application of enhanced co-operation as
yet. In contrast to enhanced co-operation, however, OMCs already exist without
formally being part of the Treaties. A provision on open co-ordination would
acknowledge existing OMC practice and make it more binding and transparent.
To preserve the flexibility of open co-ordination, there should be no absolute,
exclusive list of fields of application. Instead, a horizontal article should be formu-
lated. This article could delineate the key features of open co-ordination (a proto-
type OMC) from which diverse variations might develop according to the different
requirements of respective policy fields. The article could broadly define open co-
ordination as a mutual feedback process that is composed of elements to support
learning; that includes executives and parliaments at the European, national, and
sub-national levels as well as civil society; that must be compatible with other
requirements resulting from primary and secondary law and from EC policies; and
that must respect the objectives of the Treaties. Details on the procedures could
then be listed in a catalogue that might include the following components:
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democratic legitimacy
Political framework of the EU
as a competitive advantage
The promise of a 
laboratory of integration
– OMCs must be initiated by a formal decision of the European Council, and this
decision must include a clear definition of the OMC and delegate the opera-
tional set-up to the Commission and Council;
– During the set-up of an OMC, the Commission and Council must consult all
concerned actors within the relevant policy field (including, e.g., the private
sector and civil society) in order to develop suitable OMC objectives and pro-
cesses;
– The Commission must report systematically and regularly to the European
Parliament and national parliaments;
– OMC processes must be regularly documented and reviewed through transpa-
rent procedures managed by the Commission; these procedures should evalu-
ate not only the outcome of the OMC but the OMC process itself;
– The early warning mechanism must be applied to OMC processes (i.e., nation-
al parliaments and the European Court of Justice must be involved).
This catalogue of measures would reduce the excessive ‘openness’ of current OMC
processes and enhance the transparency and democratic legitimacy of open co-
ordination. This clarification of procedures and principles would also affect deci-
sion-makers’perception of open co-ordination: having a clear ‘road map’(what you
see is what you get) rather than a vague concept that can be variably interpreted
might enhance the – heretofore inadequate – commitment of member states to
open co-ordination. Nevertheless, since these recommendations contain neither a
definitive list of fields of application nor a detailed design that must be applied to
all OMCs, the method’s flexibility would be preserved.
5. Concluding remarks
Cross-border comparisons of national practices, as is performed within OMCs, are
not new. But such comparisons go further within the EU context than in other
institutions such as the OECD, because the EU offers a political framework that is
lacking in other international arenas. In that sense, the unique system of the EU –
with its formalised co-operation and multilevel exchange of information and ideas
– can turn out to be a competitive advantage, even without the existence of formal
constraints.
So far, the history of open co-ordination has been very short, and the experience
of a few years has probably revealed more weaknesses than positive results. In
light of these performance deficits, open co-ordination certainly does not repre-
sent a policymaking panacea. However, this does not mean that its inherent
potential cannot be further developed and realised, or that it should be dropped as
an instrument of governance.
Lisbon was initiated in 2000 as an umbrella strategy grouping existing priorities and
policies in order to establish greater coherence from the top. The launch of the first
OMC generation was characterised by a significant amount of randomness. From a
bottom-up perspective, much progress remains to be made in making open co-ordi-
nation an effective instrument of governance. In that sense, open co-ordination will
remain a ‘work in progress’ and a ‘laboratory of integration’ during the upcoming
years. The strategies and measures proposed in this paper seek to reduce the con-
cept’s vagueness and thereby to help transform open co-ordination from a second-
best alternative to a democratic and effective option in multilevel governance.
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